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Abstract In health insurance, voluntary deductibles are
offered to the insured in return for a premium rebate.
Previous research has shown that 11 % of the Dutch
insured opted for a voluntary deductible (VD) in health
insurance in 2014, while the highest VD level was finan-
cially profitable for almost 50 % of the population in ret-
rospect. To explain this discrepancy, this paper identifies
and discusses six potential determinants of the decision to
opt for a VD from the behavioral economic literature: loss
aversion, risk attitude, ambiguity aversion, debt aversion,
omission bias, and liquidity constraints. Based on these
determinants, five potential strategies are proposed to
increase the number of insured opting for a VD. Presenting
the VD as the default option and providing transparent
information regarding the VD are the two most promising
strategies. If, as a result of these strategies, more insured
would opt for a VD, moral hazard would be reduced.
Keywords Voluntary deductibles Moral hazard  Health
insurance  Behavioral economics  Prospect theory 
Nudge theory
JEL Classification D03  D11  D81  I11  I13
Introduction
Although fiercely debated (e.g., [24, 54]), cost sharing is an
effective way to counteract moral hazard1 in health insur-
ance [37, 41, 74]. One type of cost sharing is to provide the
insured with the possibility to opt for a voluntary deduc-
tible in return for a premium rebate. Previous research has
shown that a voluntary deductible was expected to be
financially profitable for almost 50 % of the Dutch popu-
lation in 2014 [65], while at the same time only 11 % of the
Dutch insured opted for a voluntary deductible [67]. This
discrepancy suggests that reasons other than the prof-
itability influence the decision to opt for a voluntary
deductible. The aim of this paper is twofold: (1) to identify
determinants of the decision to opt for a voluntary deduc-
tible to shed light on the observed discrepancy, and (2) to
provide strategies that can potentially increase the number
of insured opting for a voluntary deductible. After all, if
more insured would opt for a voluntary deductible, moral
hazard will, ceteris paribus, be reduced.
In the next section, we elaborate on the Dutch example
in which the discrepancy is observed (‘‘The Dutch situa-
tion’’ section). In the ‘‘Potential determinants of the deci-
sion to opt for a voluntary deductible’’ section, six potential
determinants of the decision to opt for a voluntary deduc-
tible are identified from the behavioral economic literature,
and these determinants are discussed in order to shed light
on the observed discrepancy. Subsequently, the ‘‘Potential
strategies’’ section provides five potential strategies to
increase the number of insured opting for a voluntary
deductible. Finally, the implications for moral hazard are& K. P. M. van Winssen
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1 Moral hazard refers to the change in health behavior and
consumption caused by the fact that the health insurer reimburses
the costs [14, 73].
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discussed in the ‘‘Implications for moral hazard’’ section
and the conclusion is provided in the ‘‘Conclusions’’
section.
The Dutch situation
The Health Insurance Act, enacted in 2006,2 obligates all
Dutch residents to buy basic health insurance from a pri-
vate insurer for community-rated premiums, which are
mostly automatically deducted from the insured’s bank
account [51]. By this law, a mandatory deductible requires
each adult to pay the first €360 (i.e., deductible level of
2014) of healthcare expenses out-of-pocket per year. On
top of the mandatory deductible, adults can opt for a vol-
untary deductible of one of five levels (€100, €200, €300,
€400, or €500) for which they receive a premium rebate in
return that is deducted from their monthly premium.
Lawfully, the rebate must be equal for each insured opting
for the same deductible level within the same health
insurance product.3 In 2014, the average premium rebate
for the highest deductible level was €240 and varied among
insurers from €180 to €300 per individual per year. In
financial terms, opting for a voluntary deductible in a
specific year has been profitable for an individual if the out-
of-pocket expenses under the voluntary deductible (on top
of the mandatory deductible) in that year were smaller than
the offered premium rebate of that year [64, 65]. Based on
Dutch claims data of more than 800,000 individuals, Van
Winssen et al. [65] showed that opting for the highest
voluntary deductible level against the average premium
rebate would retrospectively have been profitable for 48 %
of the Dutch insured in 2014. Their research showed that,
on average, a voluntary deductible was profitable for males
up to the age of 50, for healthy insured, and for insured for
whom opting for a voluntary deductible would have been
profitable in previous years. They additionally show that
for almost 20 % of the insured, a voluntary deductible
would have been profitable in all 5 years prior to their
research year, implying that for a substantial group of
insured the profitability is fairly stable over the years. In
real life, however, only 11 % of the Dutch insured indeed
opted for a voluntary deductible in 2014 [67]. The dis-
crepancy between the latter group and the group of insured
for whom a voluntary deductible would have been prof-
itable (e.g., 48 %) implies that determinants other than the
potential financial benefit might influence the decision to
opt for a voluntary deductible. Six potential determinants
are identified and discussed in the next section.
Potential determinants of the decision to opt
for a voluntary deductible
Loss aversion
A first potential explanation for the observed discrepancy
between the percentage of insured (i.e., about 48 % in the
Netherlands in 2014) for whom a voluntary deductible is
expected to be profitable and the percentage of insured
(i.e., 11 % in the Netherlands in 2014) who actually opted
for a voluntary deductible, is loss aversion. Kahneman and
Tversky [26] explain loss aversion by stating that ‘losses
loom larger than gains’ and that ‘the aggravation that one
experiences in losing a sum of money appears to be greater
than the pleasure associated with gaining the same
amount’. Loss aversion is denoted by k, where k[ 1
implies loss aversion with avoidance of losses and little
attention to gains and k\ 1 implies gain seeking with little
attention to losses [70]. Tversky and Kahneman [62] esti-
mated k to be 2.25, meaning that the pain of losses is felt
2.25 times as much as the joy of gains. Attema et al. [1] on
the other hand estimated k in the health domain to be 1.18.
According to Kahneman and Tversky’s cumulative
prospect theory (CPT) [26, 62], the overall value (V) of a
decision (or prospect) is expressed in terms of a subjective
value (t), which assigns to each possible outcome (x) a
number that reflects the subjective value of that outcome,
and a decision weight (x), which associates with each
probability (p) a decision weight that reflects the impact of
this probability on the overall value of the prospect.
Opposed to previous studies (e.g., [12, 34]), CPT applies
the principle of diminishing marginal sensitivity to both the
value function and the weighting function. For decision
weights, this implies an inverted S-shaped weighting
function that differs for gains and losses. The outcomes are
defined relative to a reference point, which implies that the
value function measures the value of deviations from this
reference point: either gains or losses (respectively x? and
x-)4 [26]. In case of a binary prospect (p, x; y), where the
outcome is x with probability p and the outcome is y with
2 Since the possibility to opt for a voluntary deductible has already
existed for a decade, we do not expect that unfamiliarity with the
deductible would be a large contributor to the explanation of why the
insured forego deductibles. However, the percentage of insured with a
voluntary deductible has increased considerably in these years (i.e.,
from 5 % in 2006 [66] to 11 % in 2014 [67]).
3 Additionally, insurers may offer the insured who have opted for a
voluntary deductible in previous years a different premium rebate.
However, in practice, this does not happen.
4 The overall value of a prospect in CPT differs from that in expected
utility theory (EUT) where choices under uncertainty are evaluated by
their expected utility [68]. The main deviations from CPT with
respect to EUT are the dependence upon a reference point, probability
weighting and loss aversion [1]. We prefer to use CPT since it proves
to have more descriptive validity than EUT.
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probability 1 - p (such as is the case with opting for a
voluntary deductible), the evaluation of prospects becomes
[70]:
V p; x; yð Þ ¼ xþ pð Þ  u xð Þ  u yð Þð Þ þ u yð Þ
for pure gain prospects;
V p; x; yð Þ ¼ x pð Þ  u xð Þ  u yð Þð Þ þ u yð Þ
for pure loss prospects, and;
V p; x; yð Þ ¼ xþ pð Þ  u xð Þ þ x 1 pð Þ  u yð Þ
for mixed prospects, where x[ y:
Often it is assumed that the reference point in any deci-
sion is the current state of wealth, although the expected
state might be the relevant reference point in some situ-
ations [72]. In case of the decision to opt for a voluntary
deductible, several views and associated reference points
can be considered. Table 1 shows four potential scenarios
and the way they are evaluated according to CPT based
upon two dimensions of the decision to opt for a volun-
tary deductible. The first dimension regards whether the
premium for health insurance is excluded or included in
the insured’s perception. The second dimension regards
whether the decision is perceived as a one-stage or two-
stage process. If the decision is perceived as a one-stage
process, the premium rebate is integrated into the
deductible amount, while if a two-stage process is
perceived, the received premium rebate is separated from
the deductible amount. Hershey and Schoemaker [20] and
Bleichrodt et al. [5] found that one of the offered alter-
natives is often taken as the reference point. Schmidt [52]
adds that the reference point when opting for a voluntary
deductible is most likely full insurance. This would imply
that not opting for a voluntary deductible seems to be the
relevant reference point in each of the four scenarios in
Table 1. This means that, from this reference point, the
insured decides whether to opt for a voluntary deductible
or to retain the reference point.
The presence of loss aversion largely depends on the
perception of the reference point. Prospects coded as losses
from the reference point are affected by loss aversion.
Wakker [70] emphasizes that loss aversion only concerns
mixed prospects (i.e., where the outcome is either a gain or
a loss) and does not affect preferences between pure gain
and pure loss prospects. In that case, loss aversion is only
present in scenario 1, since only this scenario regards a
mixed prospect. For scenario 2, loss aversion is expected to
be absent because the separate stages respectively regard a
gain prospect and a loss prospect5 but not a mixed prospect.
Table 1 Four scenarios, and the way they are evaluated according to CPT, regarding the insured’s perception of the decision (or prospect) to opt
for a voluntary deductible of €500, assuming that ‘not opting for a voluntary deductible’ is the reference point
Premium
Excluded Included
Process One-stage
process
Scenario 1: Mixed prospect Scenario 3: Loss prospect
Probability p to gain €240 (x)
Probability 1 - pa to lose €260 (y)b,c
Probability p to lose €917 (x)
Probability 1 - p to lose €1417 (y)
V (p, x; y) = x?(p) 9 t(240) ? x-(1 - p) 9 t(-260) V (p, x; y) = x-(p) 9 (t(-1417)–t(-917)) ? t(-917)
Two-stage
process
Scenario 2: Gain and loss prospect Scenario 4: Loss and loss prospect
Certainty of gaining €240 (x)
AND
Probability p to lose nothing (y)
Probability 1 - p to lose €500 (z)
Certainty of losing €917 (x)
AND
Probability p to lose nothing (y)
Probability 1 - p to lose €500 (z)
V (1, x) = t(240)
AND
V (p, y; z) = x?(p) 9 t(0) ? x-(1 - p) 9 t(-500)
V (1, x) = t(-917)
AND
V (p, y; z) = x?(p) 9 t(0) ? x-(1 - p) 9 t(-500)
a p is in all scenarios defined as the probability of staying healthy, while 1 - p is defined as the probability of getting sick
b The proposed prospects (in all scenarios) concern a simplified version (i.e., either no healthcare expenses under the voluntary deductible are
incurred or healthcare expenses that exceed the voluntary deductible are incurred), while, in practice, the insured has to deal with a more
continuous distribution of healthcare expenses
c The outcomes and premiums in all scenarios are based upon the average offered premium rebate (i.e., €240) for a voluntary deductible of €500
and the average premium (i.e., €1157) in the Dutch basic health insurance in 2014
5 We define a mixed prospect as a prospect that involves a gain and a
loss and do not regard zero to be a gain. Therefore, we do not regard
the second stage of scenarios 2 and 4 as mixed prospects but
respectively as a gain and loss prospect.
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Scenario 3 regards a loss prospect and the two stages in
scenario 4 both regard a loss prospect and therefore loss
aversion is expected to be absent in these scenarios.
Regarding the latter scenarios, the issue of whether the
health insurance premium is perceived as an intended
expenditure (i.e., in some countries, including the Nether-
lands, individuals are obliged to buy health insurance) and
therefore not subject to loss aversion or perceived as a loss
and therefore potentially subject to loss aversion, is unre-
solved in the scientific literature to date (e.g., [3, 4, 18, 38,
39, 58]). So from the viewpoint of scenario 1, the insured
may forego the voluntary deductible since they are loss-
averse and prefer the reference point (i.e., no voluntary
deductible).
Risk attitude
Risk attitude is a second potential determinant of the
decision to opt for a voluntary deductible. Kahneman and
Tversky [26] propose that diminishing marginal sensitivity
with respect to outcomes for both gains and losses
enhances risk aversion6 for gains and risk seeking for
losses. Illustratively, individuals generally prefer a certain
gain of 100 over a gain of 200 with a probability of 0.5, but
if the prospects are reversed (i.e., a certain loss of 100 or a
loss of 200 with a probability of 0.5), individuals prefer the
latter option. However, the combination of diminishing
marginal sensitivity for both the value function and the
decision weighting function implies a fourfold pattern of
risk attitudes: individuals are risk-averse for gains and risk-
seeking for losses of moderate to high probabilities (larger
than approximately 0.35) and risk-seeking for gains and
risk-averse for losses of small probabilities (smaller than
approximately 0.35) [62].
The insured’s objective probability of the outcomes of
opting for a voluntary deductible is unknown.7 The proba-
bility that opting for a voluntary deductible results in a loss
would be small for healthy insured. Van Winssen et al. [65]
have shown that especially young males and insured for
whom a voluntary deductible would have been profitable in
the past have a high probability (i.e., larger than 0.65) of a
positive financial result. Furthermore, their results show,
based upon a combination of background characteristics of
insured, that more than 40 % of the insured have a predicted
probability larger than 0.65 that opting for a voluntary
deductible is profitable. Note that insured might not be
aware of their own probability that opting for a voluntary
deductible is financially profitable. Furthermore, prospect
theory shows that individuals are bad at estimating proba-
bilities and often overestimate probabilities of rare events
[72]. Additionally, determining this probability might be
very complicated and may impose a high cognitive burden.
Assuming scenario 1 in Table 1 and based upon the fourfold
pattern of risk attitudes, it is expected that insured within the
observed discrepancy (i.e., the difference between the 11 %
of insured who actually opted for a voluntary deductible and
the 48 % of insured for whom a voluntary deductible would
have been profitable) will be risk-averse since the proba-
bility of loss is considered to be small. However, assuming
scenarios 2 and 4, where the choice is considered a two-
stage process, the effect of the risk attitude is unclear. Since
the first stage of the decision does not involve any uncer-
tainty, risk attitude is not expected to have any effect on the
decision in that stage. In the second stage, risk aversion is
expected such as in scenario 1 because the risk of a loss
remains small. However, the combined effect of both stages
is unknown. Assuming scenario 3, where the decision
always results in a loss, risk-seeking behavior is expected.
Gorter and Schilp [16] support the notion that risk aversion
potentially plays a role in the decision to opt for a voluntary
deductible by showing that risk preferences (e.g., financial
risk tolerance, smoking and drinking behavior) have a sig-
nificant positive effect on the choice for a voluntary
deductible. Rice [46] emphasizes that the degree of risk
aversion alone cannot explain individuals’ preference for
low deductibles and that loss aversion remains an important
determinant. Additionally, several studies have shown that
presenting individuals with prospects within an insurance
context may enhance risk aversion. Schoemaker and Kun-
reuther [53] report that, although mathematically equivalent,
45 % of the respondents preferred a zero deductible option
presented in an insurance context, while only 13 % preferred
this option outside the insurance context. Hershey et al. [19]
demonstrate a similar result and state that individuals are
more risk averse under the insurance formulation than under
the gamble formulation of the same prospect. Since the
decision to opt for a voluntary deductible is considered
within an insurance context, these studies indicate that risk
aversion may be more pronounced than mentioned before.
In sum, the effect of risk attitude on the decision to opt for a
voluntary deductible is largely unclear and depends strongly
on the scenario. For scenario 1, risk aversion is expected,
which might explain why the insured forego deductibles,
while for scenario 3, risk-seeking behavior is expected,
which would predict that insured do opt for a deductible.
6 For the definition of risk aversion see [42].
7 Obviously, chronically ill insured are aware of their probability
since they know for certain that opting for a voluntary deductible is
not profitable for them under the current design. However, the aim of
this paper is to shed light on the discrepancy between the low
percentage of insured who do opt for a voluntary deductible and the
high percentage of insured for whom opting for a voluntary
deductible is expected to be profitable. Opting for a voluntary
deductible is not expected to be profitable for chronically ill and
therefore we do not aim to provide determinants of their decision to
opt for a voluntary deductible.
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Ambiguity aversion
Ambiguity aversion8 is a third potential determinant of the
decision to opt for a voluntary deductible and has been
incorporated into CPT. According to Ellsberg [10] ambi-
guity regards ‘the nature of one’s information concerning
the relative likelihood of events’, which depends on ‘the
amount, type, reliability and ‘unanimity’ of information’.
This gives rise to ‘one’s degree of confidence in an esti-
mate of relative likelihoods’. Frisch and Baron [13] add
that this uncertainty about probabilities is created by
missing information that is relevant and could be known.
Ambiguity aversion captures individuals’ preferences for
prospects with known probabilities over prospects with
unknown probabilities and was first presented by Ellsberg
[10]. In a hypothetical experiment, individuals were con-
fronted with two urns. The first urn contained 100 red and
black balls in an unknown ratio and the second urn con-
tained exactly 50 red and 50 black balls. The majority of
respondents preferred to bet on either red or black in urn
two rather than in urn one, indicating ambiguity aversion.
Ritov and Baron [47] show the presence of ambiguity
aversion in healthcare in a study on children’s vaccination,
where the vaccination reduces the risk of dying from a
specific disease, but simultaneously might have adverse
health effects. When ambiguity about the risk of adverse
health effects was caused by missing information (i.e., a
child had a high risk or no risk of adverse effects, but it was
impossible to find out which) individuals were more
reluctant to vaccinate, indicating ambiguity aversion. In
most experiments on ambiguity aversion, respondents had
to choose between two situations: one with known proba-
bilities and another with unknown probabilities. In case of
opting for a voluntary deductible, a comparison with
known probabilities is absent. Chow and Sarin [9] con-
ducted several experiments concerning ambiguity aversion
under comparative and non-comparative conditions and
conclude that the ambiguity effect exists under both con-
ditions, but that it is significantly reduced in the non-
comparative condition. This indicates that ambiguity
aversion may actually influence the decision to opt for a
voluntary deductible, even though a comparison with
known probabilities lacks. Ellsberg [10] adds that indi-
viduals often perceive the status-quo as the situation with
low variation and that ambiguities of the new situation are
more salient than those of the current situation. Therefore,
when deciding to opt for a voluntary deductible, ambiguity
aversion might create a preference for the current situation.
This causes insured without a voluntary deductible not to
opt for a voluntary deductible in the next year even if this
would result in the same (or a better) expected value. Note
that from ambiguity aversion it follows that individuals
will value provision of any information that reduces their
ambiguity, even if it will not change their decision, while
standard economic theory predicts that information is only
demanded if it affects the decision [7].
Several studies argue that a (psychological) driver of
ambiguity aversion is found in the competence hypothesis
that states that individuals prefer to bet on their beliefs
in situations where they feel knowledgeable, and prefer to
bet on chance when they feel ignorant [17, 29, 63]. Several
researchers show that insured have limited knowledge
about their health insurance [22, 44] and others add that
individuals misunderstand complex price schedules
including premiums and cost-sharing arrangements [2, 32,
35]. Additionally, estimating the probability that a volun-
tary deductible would be financially profitable might be
complex and might impose a high cognitive burden. This
could especially be the case for individuals with low levels
of numeracy and/or health literacy. Based upon these
studies, individuals’ limited knowledge about health
insurance could indicate that (in)competence affects the
degree of ambiguity aversion for the decision to opt for a
voluntary deductible. In sum, since probabilities regarding
the profitability of voluntary deductible are absent, ambi-
guity aversion (partially through incompetence) might
explain why insured forego deductibles.
Debt aversion
A fourth potential determinant of the decision to opt for a
voluntary deductible is debt aversion, which stems from
mental accounting theory [58, 59]. Thaler defines mental
accounting as ‘the set of cognitive operations used by
individuals and households to organize, evaluate, and keep
track of financial activities’ [59]. The theory incorporates
CPT and provides a better understanding of the psycho-
logical processes that underlie choices and decisions. Pre-
lec and Loewenstein [43] build upon Thaler’s theory and
predict strong debt aversion because individuals establish
mental accounts that create linkages between consumption
and payments. Debt aversion in their work is defined by
individuals’ preferences to prepay for consumption and to
get paid for work after completion. Individuals dislike the
feeling of ‘having the meter running’ and prefer flat-rate
pricing schemes even if they pay more for the same usage
[43, 59]. The latter is called the flat rate bias and can be
illustrated by a preference for unlimited Internet access at a
fixed monthly price over paying per megabyte. Prelec and
Loewenstein [43] provide two motives why individuals are
inclined to prepay for a product. Firstly, individuals hope to
enjoy the product untroubled from payment concerns and
secondly, individuals want to avoid the unpleasant
8 Ambiguity aversion is sometimes also referred to as uncertainty
aversion.
Potential determinants of deductible uptake in health insurance: How to increase uptake in… 1063
123
experience of paying for consumption that has already been
enjoyed.
Debt aversion firstly predicts that insured dislike paying
for healthcare after consumption and secondly that insured
prefer flat-rate pricing schemes (e.g., health insurance) to
payment decoupling. This makes debt aversion relevant for
the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible. Debt aver-
sion could prevent insured from opting for a voluntary
deductible since, if the insured opts for a voluntary
deductible, healthcare is paid for after consumption, while
if the insured does not opt for a voluntary deductible, a flat
rate is paid in advance. Overall, due to the debt that results
from consuming healthcare when having a voluntary
deductible, insured might forego deductibles.
Omission bias
Omission bias is a fifth potential determinant of the deci-
sion to opt for a voluntary deductible. Samuelson and
Zeckhauser [50] introduced the status quo bias that
describes individuals’ tendency of ‘doing nothing or
maintaining one’s current or previous decision’. Ritov and
Baron [48], however, state that two claims are embedded in
this bias: firstly, individuals prefer to keep the current state
and secondly, individuals are reluctant to take action to
change this state. The latter is called omission bias. Ritov
and Baron [48] explain status quo bias by the fact that
changing the status quo requires an act, while keeping the
status quo requires only an omission. Through three
experiments they show that the omission bias was present
in choice whether the status quo was changed by action or
not. Furthermore, they demonstrate that no consistent sta-
tus quo bias was found in choice when both choices did
(not) involve an action. This result corresponds to norm-
theory where Kahneman and Miller [27] state that omis-
sions are considered the norm, while commissions are
compared to what would have happened if nothing had
been done. So, regardless of the outcome, omissions are
evaluated as neutral, where commissions are evaluated as
negative if the outcomes are worse and evaluated as posi-
tive if the outcomes are better than the expected outcome
of inaction.
A potentially underlying factor of omission bias is
decision fatigue, which means that individuals tire from
making decisions in general [72]. A second potentially
related factor to omission bias concerns transaction costs
[55]. Transaction costs regard the time and effort that it
takes to choose a plan with or without a voluntary deduc-
tible. Another potentially related factor is regret avoidance,
which implies that whenever choice can induce regret,
individuals have an incentive to eliminate choice [57].
Regret avoidance helps explain individuals’ preference for
first dollar coverage, since many individuals find decisions
that involve trade-offs between healthcare and money
unpleasant [57]. Thaler [57] considered the following
example: for their child, a couple has to decide on taking a
diagnostic test that costs x. A small risk exists that the child
has a serious disease that can only be treated if detected
early. The couple will certainly experience regret if they
decide not to test the child and he/she is found to have the
disease. If the test is performed and shows the likely neg-
ative result, the couple may regret the expenditure, espe-
cially if it was expensive relative to their wealth. These
psychic costs could be avoided if all healthcare consump-
tion is prepaid and no decision (i.e., act) is required.
Decision fatigue may affect the decision to opt for a
voluntary deductible, since insured might just be tired from
making all kinds of (financial) decisions and therefore
decide to renew their current plan (i.e., the plan with(out) a
voluntary deductible). Furthermore, transaction costs may
affect the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible since
insured would want to avoid these costs and therefore
renew their current plan (i.e., the plan with(out) a voluntary
deductible). Regret avoidance may affect the decision to
opt for a voluntary deductible since insured might not want
to take the risk of having to regret the decision (not) to opt
for a voluntary deductible if healthcare expenses that
exceed (or stay below) the deductible amount are incurred.
Additional to these direct effects, these factors might also
indirectly effect the decision to opt for a voluntary
deductible. After all, if an insured has opted for a voluntary
deductible, he needs to make more and more complex
decisions regarding the usage of healthcare services (e.g.,
when and where to seek care and how much these services
cost) while little support for making these decisions is
available. With this in prospect when opting for a voluntary
deductible, omission bias might also indirectly prevent
insured from opting for a voluntary deductible. In short,
omission bias (and related to that, decision fatigue, trans-
action costs and regret avoidance) may directly and indi-
rectly affect the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible
since for most insured (i.e., those insured without a vol-
untary deductible) it requires an act to change their current
plan to a plan with a voluntary deductible, which they are
reluctant to do.
Liquidity constraints
A sixth potential determinant of the decision to opt for a
voluntary deductible is the fear of encountering liquidity
problems. Gorter and Schilp [16] hypothesize that con-
sumption commitments (e.g., mortgage payments) explain
the low percentage of Dutch insured opting for a voluntary
deductible. Additionally, several studies researched the
impact of liquidity constraints on risk attitude and loss
aversion. Firstly, Chetty and Szeidl [8] conclude that
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consumption commitments, since they are costly to adjust
(e.g., mortgage payments can only be adjusted by moving),
increase risk aversion for small and moderate stakes. For
example, if an individual is forced to reduce his expendi-
ture by 10 % and has precommitted 50 % of his income, he
must reduce spending on discretionary items by 20 %.
Since the precommitted expenditure is not freely adjus-
table, the utility curvature is greater than if it would be
adjustable as to amplify risk aversion. Secondly, Novem-
sky and Kahneman [38] state that for consumers who
maintain a tight budget, the purchase of a good that was not
budgeted for is associated with giving up some other good
(i.e., either consumption or savings). This is then evaluated
as a loss, which is consistent with the finding of Wicker
et al. [71] that there is more loss aversion when a greater
proportion of money is designated for necessities. These
studies indicate that liquidity constraints could be closely
related to other determinants that are identified within this
paper, such as risk attitude and loss aversion. Thirdly,
Sydnor [56] investigated if liquidity constraints explain the
preference for low deductibles in home insurance. Though
this was not the case, it could be interesting to study
whether this holds for the health insurance market.
Due to liquidity constraints, insured might not opt for a
voluntary deductible because they may be unable or may
fear to be unable to pay the deductible amount if healthcare
is consumed.9 Furthermore, liquidity constraints are
expected to increase risk aversion and loss aversion and
thereby (negatively) affect the decision to opt for a vol-
untary deducible.
Overview of potential determinants
This section discusses in short the effect of the six potential
determinants on the decision to opt for a voluntary
deductible. Note that the different determinants are not per
definition independent, and could be closely related (e.g.,
liquidity constraints could be related to risk aversion). Loss
aversion is only expected to make insured forego voluntary
deductibles in scenario 1 from Table 1. For scenario 1, the
fourfold pattern of risk attitudes furthermore predicts risk-
averse behavior, while the effect for scenarios 2 and 4 (i.e.,
the two-stage scenarios) is unclear since in the first stage
uncertainty plays no role while risk aversion is expected for
the second stage. Regarding scenario 3, risk-seeking
behavior is expected that may encourage insured to opt for
a voluntary deductible. Furthermore, irrespective of the
scenario, ambiguity aversion may arise since the proba-
bility distribution of healthcare expenses is largely
unknown, which may explain why insured forego deduc-
tibles. Since in case of a voluntary deductible healthcare is
consumed first and paid after, debt aversion may explain
why insured do not opt for a voluntary deductible. Omis-
sion bias is seen as a fifth potential determinant since
individuals are reluctant to take action to change their
current plan, which is necessary for the uptake of deduc-
tibles. Finally, liquidity constraints are expected to influ-
ence the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible and
increase both risk aversion and loss aversion. In general, it
is expected that especially in scenario 1 of Table 1, insured
would not be inclined to opt for a voluntary deductible
since the six potential determinants all negatively affect the
overall value of opting for a voluntary deductible compared
to not opting for a voluntary deductible. In scenarios 2, 3,
and 4, some of the determinants are not or less relevant,
i.e., loss aversion is expected to be absent in those sce-
narios and the effect of risk attitude is unclear in scenarios
2 and 4. Therefore, the overall effect of these scenarios on
the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible is unclear.
Which of the proposed scenarios is adopted by insured
in practice is unknown. For two reasons, however, we
believe that scenarios 1 and 2 are most likely to be adopted.
The first reason is that we suspect that (Dutch) insured do
not include the premium in their decision. For example,
taking out health insurance is mandatory in the Netherlands
and the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible is a
subsequent decision that may not be directly related to the
fact that a premium has to be paid for health insurance
itself. The second reason is that the premium is mostly paid
on a monthly basis, while the voluntary deductible con-
cerns a yearly amount. This might make integrating the
health insurance premium into the decision to opt for a
voluntary deductible difficult for insured.
Potential strategies
Based upon the six potential determinants of the decision to
opt for a voluntary deductible, this section discusses five
potential strategies that could increase the number of
insured opting for a voluntary deductible. While discussing
these strategies, we will incorporate nudge theory as pro-
posed by Thaler and Sunstein [61]. The idea behind
nudging is to move individuals in directions that will make
their lives better without forcing them. They consider a
nudge to be ‘any aspect of the choice architecture that
alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without for-
bidding any options or significantly changing their eco-
nomic incentives’ [61]. Nudges are not considered to be
mandates and should be easy and cheap to avoid. An
illustrative example of a nudge is putting fruit at eye level
in a school canteen to make children eat healthier, while
9 Liquidity constraints may also encourage insured to opt for a
voluntary deductible since the premium rebate reduces the monthly
premium and relieves liquidity constraints.
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entirely banning junk food would not be considered a
nudge. Note that not all proposed strategies can be con-
sidered a nudge and that within this paper only strategy one
and three are considered a nudge. This will be further
discussed in the subsequent sections. Table 2 shows how
the five different strategies affect the determinants of the
decision to opt for a voluntary deductible.
Default option
A first promising strategy for increasing the number of
insured opting for a voluntary deductible is to present the
voluntary deductible as the default option. This implies that
when buying insurance, the plan includes by default a
voluntary deductible for the associated premium. The plan
would not be mandatory because insured can commute the
voluntary deductible for an increase in premium. Table 3
shows the insured’s perception of the voluntary deductible
as the default option. According to the literature, this
strategy is expected to increase the number of insured
opting for a voluntary deductible [25, 31, 36, 60, 61] since
it potentially affects three determinants from the theoretical
framework. Note that this strategy intends to shift the
reference point from ‘not opting for a voluntary deductible’
to ‘opting for a voluntary deductible’. Firstly, the effect of
loss aversion would diminish since, assuming that ‘opting
for a voluntary deductible’ is the reference point, ‘not
opting for a voluntary deductible’ is a pure loss prospect
(i.e., the deductible has to be commuted for an increase in
premium). In case of a pure loss prospect, loss aversion is
absent [70] and therefore has no effect on the decision to
opt for a voluntary deductible if a voluntary deductible is
the default option. Secondly, with ‘opting for a voluntary
deductible’ as the reference point, risk seeking behavior is
expected since commuting the voluntary deductible implies
a certain loss. Thirdly, with this strategy, the insured is
inclined to retain the voluntary deductible due to omission
bias (and decision fatigue and transaction costs). If a
default option is set, it is expected that more insured would
opt for a voluntary deductible than under an opt-in design.
Therefore, making the voluntary deductible the default
option can be considered a strong nudge. Furthermore, the
nudging power of the default option will be reinforced if
the option comes with some implicit or explicit suggestion
that it represents the norm, which is related to norm-theory,
or the recommended course of action [61]. An example of
the effect of default options can be found in MediShield (a
basic catastrophic illness insurance scheme) in Singapore.
In 1990, with the introduction of MediShield, the Singa-
pore government wanted to ensure that as many individuals
Table 2 Summary table of the determinants regarding the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible (VD) and the way they are affected by the
different strategies
Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 Strategy 4 Strategy 5
Default option Information
regarding the
voluntary
deductible
Information
regarding
healthcare
expenses
No-claim rebate Saving for
healthcare
Loss
aversion
If the reference point is ‘opting for a VD’,
loss aversion is eliminated. If ‘not opting
for a VD’ is the reference point, then loss
aversion remains the same
– – Loss aversion could be
reduced depending on
whether loss aversion
occurs for the premium
–
Risk
attitude
If the reference point is ‘opting for a VD’:
risk seeking. If ‘not opting for a VD’ is the
reference point: risk aversion
– – – –
Ambiguity
aversion
– Increased
competence and
decreased
ambiguity
aversion
Reduced
effect of
ambiguity
aversion
– –
Debt
aversion
– – – Reduced effect of debt
aversion
Reduced
effect of
debt
aversion
Omission
bias
Omission bias remains, but causes the insured
to retain the VD
– – – –
Liquidity
constraints
– – – – Reduced
effect of
liquidity
constraints
1066 K. P. M. van Winssen et al.
123
as possible would be covered by this plan. In order to reach
this goal, they implemented an opt-out scheme where
everyone would be automatically enrolled. As a result of
this, the overall coverage for MediShield raised from 51 %
in 1990 to 88 % in 2012 [33].
Provision of information regarding the voluntary
deductible
A second promising strategy to increase the number of
insured opting for a voluntary deductible is to provide
insured with information regarding the voluntary deduc-
tible. According to the literature, this strategy is expected
to increase individuals’ competence [35]. Through the
increase in competence, the effect of ambiguity aversion on
the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible could be
reduced [17, 29, 63], which could result in a higher uptake
of voluntary deductibles. The information could for
instance concern the functioning of the voluntary deduc-
tible.10 The information could elucidate that a voluntary
deductible results in both a premium rebate and a risk that
out-of-pocket payments have to be made and that the profit
is the balance of these two. The information could fur-
thermore describe the relation between the voluntary
deductible and other cost-sharing arrangements such that
individuals can better estimate their expected out-of-pocket
expenses due to the voluntary deductible (and thus whether
opting for a voluntary deductible will be profitable). For
example, Van Winssen et al. [65] show that over 40 % of
the Dutch insured had healthcare expenses even below the
mandatory deductible of €360. For those insured, opting for
a voluntary deductible would be profitable, but they need to
know how the voluntary deductible and other cost-sharing
arrangements relate in order to consider opting for a vol-
untary deductible. Finally, Reitsma-van Rooijen et al. [45]
show that Dutch insured avoid the GP because of the
mandatory deductible, while GP costs are exempted from
the deductible. Apparently, these individuals are not aware
of the fact that these healthcare services are exempted from
the deductible. Therefore, information could address the
exempted healthcare services. Note that all information
should be understandable because if individuals are pro-
vided with information only an expert would know how to
use, incompetence actually increases [15].
Provision of information regarding healthcare
expenses
A third potential strategy to increase the number of insured
opting for a voluntary deductible is to provide insured with
information regarding their healthcare expenses.11 For
instance, the information could show the number of pre-
vious years that opting for a voluntary deductible would
have been profitable. Van Winssen et al. [65] show that the
more (recent) years the voluntary deductible would have
been profitable in the past, the larger the probability that
opting for a voluntary deductible would be profitable in the
upcoming year. Furthermore, insured could be provided
with an objective predicted probability that opting for a
voluntary deductible would be profitable based upon
background characteristics such as age, gender, and
chronic illness, such as Van Winssen et al. [65] have
estimated. Finally, insurers could provide insured with an
up-to-date overview regarding their past healthcare
expenses.
Based upon the theoretical framework in the ‘‘Poten-
tial determinants of the decision to opt for a voluntary
deductible’’ section, this strategy is expected to directly
influence the effect of ambiguity aversion on the deci-
sion to opt for a voluntary deductible since information
on the outcome probability of the voluntary deductible is
Table 3 The insured’s
perception and the associated
value function regarding the
voluntary deductible for
strategy one (i.e., the default
option) and strategy four (i.e., a
no-claim rebate). Presented are
the perceptions for scenario 1
from Table 1, but they could be
applied to the other scenarios as
well
Opting for a voluntary deductible Not opting for a voluntary deductible
Strategy 1—Present the voluntary deductible as the default option
Probability p to lose nothing (x)
Probability 1 - p to lose €500 (y)
Certainty of a premium increase of €240 (x)
V (p, x; y) = x?(p) 9 t(0) ? x-(1 - p) 9 t(-500) V (1, x) = t(-240)
Strategy 4—Offer a voluntary deductible in the form of a no-claim rebate
Probability p to gain €240 (x)
Probability 1 - p to pay €260 (y) too much
Certainty to lose nothing (x)
V (p, x; y) = x?(p) 9 t(240) ? x-(1 - p) 9 t(-260) V (1, x) = t(0)
10 It is assumed that individuals are aware of the fact that they can opt
for a voluntary deductible at all.
11 Note that this strategy could also provide insured with information
regarding how unattractive it would be for them to opt for a voluntary
deductible, making them less inclined to opt for a voluntary
deductible.
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provided. Note that Ellsberg [10] and Fox and Weber
[15] state that the amount, type, reliability, and una-
nimity of the information should be considered when
providing the information to insured to best reduce the
effect of ambiguity aversion on the decision to opt for a
voluntary deductible. Wakker et al. [69] studied the
effect of statistical information on the choice of insur-
ance that covers a deductible and show that the value of
the options that give rise to ambiguity aversion
decreased rather than increased when ambiguity reduced.
They state that probably the more familiar option is
preferred over the option with known probabilities,
which could be in accordance with Ellsberg’s [10] notion
that ambiguity aversion favors the status quo. Addition-
ally, their results showed that the provision of statistical
information enhanced adverse selection, which for health
insurance might be undesirable from the societal per-
spective [49]. In a study by Kling et al. [30], a random
sample of participants were sent a personal letter that
explained the costs of their current drug plan, the
cheapest comparable plan, and the savings they could
realize by switching plans. Another random sample
received generic brochures regarding the different plans.
The results show that the personal letters appear to have
nudged more individuals to pick lower-cost plans and the
overall switching rate was 10 percentage- points higher
than among the participants who received the brochures
[61]. These results could give an indication that pro-
viding insured with information regarding their health-
care expenses and the savings they could realize by
opting for a voluntary deductible could potentially
increase uptake of voluntary deductibles.
No-claim rebate
A fourth potential strategy to increase the number of
insured opting for a voluntary deductible is to present
the voluntary deductible in the form of a ‘no-claim
rebate’.12 In case of a no-claim rebate, the insured pays
a premium for health insurance and receives a fixed
amount of money (i.e., the no-claim rebate) at the end of
the year if no healthcare expenses are incurred. If
healthcare expenses are incurred, the insured receives no
rebate. In other words, compared to a situation with a
voluntary deductible, insured pay the full premium (i.e.,
they do not receive a premium rebate that they would
have received if they had opted for a voluntary deduc-
tible) and receive a no-claim rebate equal to the amount
of the original voluntary deductible (i.e., €500) if no
healthcare expenses are incurred. Assuming the Dutch
voluntary deductible of €500, the premium increase
would equal €260 and the potential rebate would be
€500.13 Compared to the current design of the voluntary
deductible, the potential loss (i.e., €-260, which is equal
to the premium increase) and gain (i.e., €240, which is
equal to the no-claim rebate minus the premium
increase) are essentially unchanged, but integrated
explicitly. Table 3 shows the insured’s perception of the
voluntary deductible in the form of a no-claim rebate.
According to the literature, this measure is expected to
increase the number of insured opting for a voluntary
deductible [25] since it potentially affects two determi-
nants from the theoretical framework. Firstly, the
increase in loss aversion due to the increase in premium
is expected to be small because of diminishing marginal
sensitivity. The effect on loss aversion depends however
on whether loss aversion for the premium is experienced.
Secondly, this strategy could reduce the effect of debt
aversion on the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible
since the insured is not in debt with the insurer, but the
insurer is potentially in debt with the individual. Fur-
thermore, this strategy could reduce the effect of debt
aversion on the decision to opt for a voluntary deduc-
tible, since the insured pays for healthcare expenses ex-
ante instead of ex-post.
Saving for healthcare
A fifth potential strategy to increase the number of insured
opting for a voluntary deductible is to offer a savings
account in combination with a voluntary deductible. Health
Savings Accounts (HSAs) are increasingly popular in the
USA, Singapore, South Africa, and China, but have dif-
ferent aims and designs [23]. In the USA, HSAs are
combined with high deductible health plans, which is
similar to the strategy proposed here. Note, however, that12 In 2006 and 2007, a no-claim rebate of €255 was implemented in
the Dutch health insurance system but substituted by a mandatory
deductible in 2008 since the five largest health insurers and several
politicians argued that the no-claim rebate would be unfair to
chronically ill and elderly, that it hardly resulted in any restrain on
healthcare expenses and that it resulted in a lot of administrative
hassle [11]. Research by Holland et al. [21] indicates that the no-claim
rebate provided only a weak incentive to reduce healthcare con-
sumption. Furthermore, although seemingly contradictory to the
previous statement, their study shows a potential danger of strategic
postponement of healthcare utilization (i.e., in order to receive the no-
claim rebate), which may have adverse health effects.
13 In the Dutch health insurance market, the average offered premium
rebate was €240 for a voluntary deductible of €500 in 2014. If the
insured would incur healthcare expenses larger than the (mandatory
and) voluntary deductible, the loss would be equivalent to €260. In
case of a no-claim rebate, this potential loss is added to the premium
(i.e., the premium is increased with €260 compared to the current
design of the voluntary deductible). In return for this premium
increase, the insured will receive up to €500 (i.e., the original
voluntary deductible amount) in return if no or little healthcare
expenses are incurred.
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the deductible amounts in the USA are larger (i.e., a plan
must have a minimum deductible of €107414 for individ-
uals and €2148 for families in 2015 to be HSA-eligible
with a maximum limit on out-of-pocket spending of €5329
for individuals and €10,658 for families) than the amounts
in the Netherlands (i.e., the voluntary deductible amounts
range from €100 to €500). Similar to the HSAs, we propose
to deposit the premium rebate upon a savings account
allowing the insured to use the (earmarked) account bal-
ance for the voluntary deductible. Literature on savings
behavior shows that individuals have self-control problems
[28], meaning that individuals have difficulty with not
spending their money on other purposes [40]. An ear-
marked savings account could mitigate this lack of self-
control by serving as a precommitment strategy [57].
Table 4 provides a potential way to finance the savings
account in case the insured opted for a voluntary deductible
of €500 and deposited the premium rebate of €240 on the
savings account (column 2). A maximum of €1200 is saved
during, for example, 5 years (column 3). Out-of-pocket
payments due to the voluntary deductible are paid from the
savings account (e.g., €25 in the first year, column 4).
Column 5 shows the account balance at the end of each
year (i.e., €215 in the first year). In the coming years, the
financing of the account continues in the same way.
According to the theoretical framework in the ‘‘Potential
determinants of the decision to opt for a voluntary deduc-
tible’’ section, there are two reasons to expect that this
strategy will increase the number of insured opting for a
voluntary deductible. Firstly, the savings account could
serve as a prepayment vehicle that diminishes the attenu-
ation of the payment on the pleasure of consumption,
which could reduce the effect of debt aversion. Secondly,
the earmarked savings account serves as a consumption
commitment especially for out-of-pocket payments due to
the voluntary deductible, which could reduce the effect of
liquidity constraints. In the USA, savings into the HSA are
encouraged by tax advantages. This could also be consid-
ered for the savings account as described here to encourage
insured to save for potential out-of-pocket payments due to
the voluntary deductible.
Implications for moral hazard
The previous section discussed five potential strategies to
increase the number of insured opting for a voluntary
deductible and consequently to reduce moral hazard.
Behavioral economics helps to explain the demand for
voluntary deductibles, but also tells us that the design of
the voluntary deductible could influence healthcare usage
[43]. To indicate the net effect on moral hazard a crucial
question is: in what way does the design of the voluntary
deductible (within the different strategies) influence the
moral hazard reduction (assuming that the strategies
increase the number of insured opting for a voluntary
deductible)? Note that the reduction of moral hazard as a
result of the voluntary deductible could regard both low-
value and high-value care. The RAND Health Insurance
Experiment showed, however, that on average the moral
hazard reduction had no significant effect on most of the
studied health indicators [6].
By presenting the voluntary deductible as the default
option and by providing insured information regarding the
voluntary deductible or regarding their healthcare expenses
(i.e., strategies 1, 2, and 3), the voluntary deductible in
itself is unchanged and therefore the individual moral
hazard reduction due to the voluntary deductible is
unchanged. However, since, as a result of these strategies,
an increase in the number of insured opting for a voluntary
deductible is expected [25, 31, 35, 60, 61], an increase in
the total moral hazard reduction is expected as well. When
presenting the voluntary deductible as a no-claim rebate
(i.e., strategy 4), the effect on the individual moral hazard
reduction is unclear, since in case of a no-claim rebate
insured only have the foresight of a potential rebate and do
not experience actual out-of-pocket payments as they do
with the current design of the voluntary deductible. It is
unknown how many more insured would have to opt for a
voluntary deductible in the form of a no-claim rebate in
order to let the total moral hazard reduction increase. To
Table 4 Example of financing the savings account in case of a voluntary deductible of €500 with an associated premium rebate of €240 (in
euros)
Premium
rebate
Total premium rebate
on savings account
Healthcare expenses under
the voluntary deductible
Account balance at the
end of the calendar year
Year 1 240 240 25 215
Year 2 240 480 120 335
Year 3 240 720 500 75
Year 4 240 960 175 140
Year 5 240 1200 0 380
14 US dollars are converted to euros using an exchange rate of
US$1 = €0.8262 (January 1, 2015).
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determine the effect of offering a savings account in
combination with a voluntary deductible (i.e., strategy 5)
on moral hazard, it would be necessary to know whether
the moral hazard reduction differs between actual out-of-
pocket payments (i.e., the current design) and expenses
from a savings account (i.e., strategy 5). Since the money is
earmarked for healthcare expenses, individuals might be
more eager to spend saved money than out-of-pocket
money. Therefore, what happens to the account balance at
the end of the year is essential (e.g., transmitted to next
year, paid to insured or lapsed). A related (and yet unan-
swered) question to this is how individuals value the
account balance at the end of the year, taking into account
discounting of money over time [40]. As with strategy 4, it
is unknown how many more insured would have to opt for
a voluntary deductible as a result of combining it with a
savings account to let the total moral hazard reduction
increase. Overall, each strategy is intended to increase the
number of insured opting for a voluntary deductible,
which, ceteris paribus, increases the total moral hazard
reduction due to the voluntary deductible. However, the
effect of (some of) the strategies on the individual moral
hazard reduction and consequently on the total moral
hazard reduction needs further research.
Conclusions
Previous research shows that a large discrepancy exits
between the percentage of insured for whom a voluntary
deductible is expected to be profitable (i.e., about 48 % in
the Netherlands in 2014) and the percentage of insured who
actually opt for a voluntary deductible (i.e., 11 % in the
Netherlands in 2014). If more insured would opt for a
voluntary deductible, a larger reduction of moral hazard
could, ceteris paribus, be reached. In this paper, six
determinants of the decision to opt for a voluntary deduc-
tible are identified: loss aversion, risk attitude, ambiguity
aversion, debt aversion, omission bias, and liquidity con-
straints. Subsequently, five potential strategies to increase
the number of insured opting for a voluntary deductible are
proposed: (1) present the voluntary deductible as the
default option, (2) provide insured with information
regarding the voluntary deductible, (3) provide insured
with information regarding their healthcare expenses, (4)
present the voluntary deductible in the form of a no-claim
rebate, and (5) combine the voluntary deductible with a
savings account. We believe that implementing the vol-
untary deductible as the default option and providing
insured with information regarding the functioning of the
voluntary deductible are the two most promising strategies
to increase uptake of voluntary deductibles and to reduce
moral hazard. Regarding the other strategies, further
research on their effect on the moral hazard reduction
would be necessary before implementing such strategies.
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